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FAILURES OF POWER-BALANCING: THE OTTOMANS AND 
BRITISH IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT 
 
AMNA ABUDYAK, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF SHARJAH 
MENTOR: ISA BLUMI 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to present Ottoman, Arab, and British dynamics in the 
Arabian Peninsula. The paper highlights British exploitation of political 
circumstances to gain presence in Iraq and the Gulf (more particularly Kuwait) 
throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As pan-Arab movements began 
to gain traction within Arab territories during the final years of the Ottoman Empire, 
Gulf tribes sought to move away from Ottoman influence and to establish greater 
sovereignty, control, and border integrity. This desire for Arab tribes to form 
independent polities was utilized by the British to competitively gain strategic 
presence against France, the Dutch, and Russia in the Arabian Peninsula and the 
Middle East on a wider scale for various reasons.  
This paper first covers internal conditions within the Ottoman Empire, as 
well as Ottoman-Arab relations. Second, utilizing historical texts, the paper 
specifies the nature of British–Arab relations to lay the historical contextual 
framework for shifting sentiments in the Gulf as the Ottoman Empire weakened. 
The paper then moves on to explicate geopolitical factors for continuous border 
disputes between Kuwait and its northern neighbor, Iraq, which eventually 
culminated in the 1990 Iraqi invasion. Secondary sources are consulted to present 
the consequences of British involvement in heightening tensions in Iraq and, 
vicariously, Kuwait due to the catalyst effect of their diplomatic missions and 
establishment of protectorates parallel to growing pan-Arab sentiment. Finally, the 
events discussed are reviewed through power-balancing theory to assess the effects 
of political decisions on both Iraq and Kuwait. 
Keywords: Pan-Arabism, tribal relations, British diplomacy, Ottoman 
Empire, power balancing, Arabian Gulf 
 
In the political climate of the 19th and 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire 
found itself a waning empire surrounded by European powers who intended to 
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increase their influence in a highly competitive environment fueled by imperial 
expansion. In a more magnified version of urban sprawl, the Ottomans struggled to 
secure the integrity and unity of their more distant provinces into the Ottoman 
Empire politically and nationally.   
By the 19th century and after tumultuous periods of reform, the Ottoman 
Empire’s frontier extended to North Africa, Mesopotamia, the Balkans, and parts 
of the Arabian Peninsula. With European powers such as France, Russia, and 
England encroaching on the Ottoman Empire, Abdulhamid II was faced with the 
need to be careful with his alliances. Sultan Abdulhamid II’s willingness to 
cooperate with the British soon fueled the disgruntled to speak out with anti-British 
sentiment (Tallon, 2019). Eventually, the Young Turks (primarily the Committee 
of Union and Progress) deposed Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1908 (Al-Hamdi, 2015). 
This deposition left the Young Turks with the burden of further securing Ottoman 
borders through various agreements and increased military presence around some 
borders (Tallon, 2019). Not long after, however, an Ottoman–Balkan war 
throughout 1912 and 1913 stripped the Ottoman Empire of its last remaining 
territories in Europe (Tallon, 2019). Along with all of this tension, throughout the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries in the Ottoman Arab provinces, particularly 
aggressively in the “fertile crescent,” an opposition movement—Pan-Arabism—
had been brewing (Dawn, 1988).  
The growing pan-Arab movement proved to be a tool for opposing imperial 
powers to exploit, especially the British. With a second government stationed in 
India, the British were highly involved in attempting to shift the balance of power 
in the Arabian Peninsula to further secure their position in India and to deter other 
European powers from establishing spheres of influence with the Arab peoples. 
This led the British to utilize tactics with tribal leaders of both Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait that they had previously used in India, as well as to interfere with Baghdad’s 
and Basra’s finely tuned political structure, leading to various consequences. 
Although British intervention in supporting Arab movements during the 1880s and 
throughout World War I assisted in achieving autonomy from the Ottomans, it 
fueled bilateral and internal conflicts in the post-WWI period, eventually setting 
the foundation for the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
The Ottomans under Sultan Abdulhamid II and after the Young Turk 
Revolution, however, were privy to the European interest in the more distant 
provinces such as those in present-day Iraq and the Gulf. Furthermore, the Ottoman 
administration recognized vulnerability to European powers (Çetinsaya, 2003). For 
instance, various governors, ambassadors, and viziers reported a British threat in 
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Iraq and in the Gulf, with particular regard to Kuwait. The emboldened efforts of 
the British to approach ambitious Arab leaders were attributed to a lack of a 
“forward policy” and to local Ottoman officials being “neutral bystanders” to 
Britain’s actions in the region throughout the 1880s (Çetinsaya, 2003, p. 199).  
Further, ambassadors noticed the “neglect” of residents in Arab provinces 
in what is now Iraq, as Ottoman officials considered those residents to be “ignorant 
and uncivilized” (Çetinsaya, 2003, p. 201). Because of this “incivility,” Ottoman 
administrators feared a conquest of Basra beginning with British control and use of 
Kuwait’s harbors (Çetinsaya, 2003). Because of this and other factors such as 
instability in the vilayets of Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad, in the years after the 1878 
Berlin Treaty, the Ottomans sought ways to pull in the periphery more aggressively, 
by planning for the Berlin–Baghdad railway, increasing naval presence, and 
implementing policies on the ground in a rather unwelcomed process of 
“Turkification”1 in an attempt to re-regularize administration empire-wide (Simon, 
2004, p. 40).  
The Arab Political Climate 
Overtures by the British in Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, and Bahrain were not 
isolated events. As British authorities (more specifically, the government of India) 
recognized a potential to exploit tensions in the region throughout the 19th century 
and the interwar years, a “scramble for Arabia” was instigated (Tallon, 2019, p. 
98). With the Ottoman Empire turning its attention to more direct rule in 
Mesopotamia after the pacification of Mohamad Ali in 1841, discontent in local 
communities began to brew (Blumi, 2012). As Arabs began to desire more 
autonomy, the pan-Arab movement mobilized. Additionally, the increasingly 
 
1 “Turkification” refers to the systematic process of limiting expression of variance in ethnicity, 
language, and religion within Ottoman territories in order to enforce Ottoman uniformity. The 
unionist ideology of the Young Turks paid little attention to diversity, as Ottomanism was largely 
synonymous with being a Muslim Ottoman Turk. This ideology led to underrepresentation of 
Arabs and other ethnic groups in the Ottoman Parliament. Because Arab identity was based 
predominantly on religion and language, Arabs felt increasingly alienated by the Young Turk 
administration imposing Turkish language policy, for instance. Further, Muslim Arabs associated 
Turkification with the phasing out of Islam from society, particularly because of the irreligous 
character of non-Arabic-speaking Ottoman government officials assigned to administrate their 
areas. The disruption of traditional social and political norms in Arab territories eventually 
encouraged Muslim Arabs to form literary organizations (e.g, al-Muntada al-Adabi) rejecting 
Turkification, in an attempt to reinforce their version of group identity. Consequently, as Arabs 
found their cultural, political, and social rights continually suppressed, an Arab Revolt ensued 
(Kayali, 1997). 
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aggressive racial Turkification policies of the Young Turks further urged and fueled 
separationist, nationalist ideas in provinces such as Basra, eventually culminating 
in the 1914 Great Arab Revolt (Simon, 2004). Pan-Arab sentiments occurred most 
prominently in tangible form within Iraq and Syria (Dawn, 1988), where 
publications of pan-Arab and nationalist thinkers were used in schools and were 
circulated heavily. In comparison, the more tribal dynamics of the Arabian 
Peninsula manifested these sentiments in expansionist strategies by various tribes, 
such as Al Saud.  
Writers such as al-Shurayqi, al-Khatib, and Miqdadi explored common 
themes of the Arab nation being a “living body” (Dawn, 1988, p. 69) and of Arabs 
as being the last of a series of Semitic migrations (i.e., Semitic wave theory), 
making them “heirs of the Semites” (Dawn, 1988, p. 70). 
With regard to external powers, pan-Arab/nationalist texts often contrasted 
the “noble” Arabs to the exploitative, economically driven, “hateful” Persians and 
“innately mean” Europeans (Dawn, 1988, p. 76). The texts also regarded the trade 
routes going through Arab territories to India as a way for external powers to 
weaken Arabs in the face of the Ottomans (Wagner, 2015). Despite this idea—
which later set the groundwork for the Ba’athist and Nasserist regimes—there was 
an ideological dissonance with pan-Arabism, as Arabs were still willing to deal 
with external powers to consolidate autonomy and greater agency from the 
Ottomans (Dawn, 1988). 
Furthermore, Arab movements also had a religious dimension represented 
in Pan-Islamism: ideas of an Arab caliphate that would preserve Arab society from 
the “second Jahiliyya” of Sufism (Dawn, 1988, p. 74), a religious sect highly 
associated with Ottoman tradition. This was showcased with the increasing control 
of Al Saud over Mecca and Medina through their use of the Wahhabis and Ikhwan 
to consolidate influence in frontiers surrounding them, which threatened Ottoman 
religious legitimacy and hajj revenues (Tallon, 2019). This later led to skirmishes 
between Al Saud and the Ottoman-backed Ibn Rashid. Other figures began to 
harness the Ottomans’ crumbling religious legitimacy as well, including Husayn 
ibn Ali (sharif of Mecca), who called for a separate Arab Muslim state for himself 
(Yaphe, 2004). 
Later in the post-WWI period, however, the once-quelled conflicts among 
movements in Arab territories gained even more traction; the pan-Islamists and 
nationalists were in almost constant conflict. The British were quick to attempt to 
take advantage of the tumult without properly understanding the complexities of 
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the interconnections of these movements, leading to major instability in areas they 
have occupied in what later became Iraq. 
British Policy and the Arabs 
Although the British did not fully comprehend political and social 
intricacies in regions such as the vilayets of what later became Iraq, early endeavors 
to explore the Gulf and surrounding areas navally in the 1700s and 1800s, mail 
links, and the presence of political residents allowed for the British administration 
to recognize the potential for a minimally challenged strategic encroachment into 
the area (Simon, 2004). Serious consideration for mobilizing more direct control in 
the Gulf by the British region began in 1913, however, when Ottoman neglect of 
the area allowed piracy, arms sales, slavery, and German presence to go unchecked, 
according to the British, threatening future British hegemony in the Gulf (Simon, 
2004). Additionally, this was an opportune time to increase presence in Ottoman 
territories in the Gulf, as the war-ravaged Ottoman Empire was focused elsewhere 
after the yearlong Balkan conflict mentioned previously. 
As World War I wore on, Britain surveyed the general situation of the 
region and consequently also surveyed societal divisions that it might utilize 
accordingly. According to a 1913 British governmental document, British policy 
was multidimensional and included with regard to “Arabia” establishment of 
protectorates in Southern Syria and Mesopotamia, a protectorate in Kuwait, 
recognition of the Hijaz as independent, encouragement of an Arab caliphate led 
by the sharif in Hijaz, and a coordinated military effort with other allied European 
powers to quell unrest. Furthermore, the press would be used to politicize Sunni 
Islam further throughout other areas in “Arabia” and even India. These plans would 
also serve to put pressure against the unstable Young Turk administration from 
within (Hurewtiz, 1914; Wagner, 2015). These policies aimed to achieve a concrete 
severance of aspiring Arab leaders from the Ottoman sphere of influence while also 
further divorcing religious credibility heralded by the Ottoman sultan as protector 
of Mecca and Medina.  
Furthermore, the British realized that to garner Arab support, their 
propositions would have to be framed to appeal to existing movements (primarily 
Pan-Islamism and Arab nationalism/Pan-Arabism, as previously mentioned). In a 
1914 British governmental proclamation to “the natives of Arabia and the Arab 
provinces,” Britain denied a desire to conquer, possess, occupy, or protect any Arab 
territories (Burdett, 1998, p. 99). Further, the text heavily references God and refers 
to the Ottomans as “Turks” who have “laid upon” the Arabs a “heavy burden” that 
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the English would “cast” with “God’s help” (Burdett, 1998, p. 100). In another 
proclamation a year later, the British maintained the same rhetoric, insisting on 
complete independence and that “please God, [the lands of Arabia] return along the 
paths of freedom to their ancient prosperity” (Burdett, 1998, p. 101), echoing the 
sentiments of Pan-Arabists and Pan-Islamists as they appealed to them.  
The British consequently increased their presence “on the ground” in the 
Arabian Peninsula and in vilayets that later made up Iraq, attempting more “hands-
on” policies. Britain took on an active role in resolving both tribal and political 
conflict in the case of Kuwait, for instance. Additionally, the extravagance of the 
buildings that housed British representatives became more prominent throughout 
the 20th century, symbolizing the growing British influence in the area and the local 
acceptance of their authority (Muir, 2008). 
Real alarm in the Ottoman Empire was heightened, however, after what was 
termed the British–Ottoman confrontation over Kuwait, spanning from 1896, with 
Muhammad Al-Sabah’s assassination, to 1904. The Ottomans considered British 
policy with the Arab provinces and areas such as Kuwait as another English 
“civilizing” mission like that with Egypt in the past (Çetinsaya, 2003). Eventually, 
the warnings and intuitions of the various Ottoman officials concerning the Arab 
provinces and the Gulf were realized, as Kuwait began to pull away from the 
Ottoman sphere of influence more definitively and ultimately succeeded in doing 
so—meaning that Ottoman policies to control dissent were not enough. 
Kuwait 
Geographically, Kuwait (“Grane,” as termed by the British) was situated 
south of the Ottoman province of Basra, strategically bordering Shatt al-Arab, 
which made it a valuable land- and sea trade route for the Ottoman Empire and a 
significant port between Basra and Bahrain, where Indian ships came to stop (Muir, 
2008). Relatedly, Kuwait was a municipality in the Ottoman Basra province. 
Kuwait’s location eventually made it a point of contention as imperial powers 
competed to absorb it into their spheres of influence. Kuwait exploited its location 
to create a commercial-friendly environment, even taking a toll on caravans that 
passed through it to transport supplies and weaponry to the Ottoman provinces of 
Damascus and Aleppo, eventually even rivaling Basra as a “trans-desert route” 
(Muir, 2008, p. 171). The flow of weapons from and to the area was especially 
problematic for the Ottomans and, later on, the British, as it gave rebel forces means 
of battle and altered the status quo (Blumi, 2012). This exploitation of movement 
was further optimized with Mubarak Al-Sabah’s increasingly strong ties with Al 
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Saud and rivalry with Ibn Rashid (Blumi, 2012). Additionally, new trade routes 
were established in the mid-1800s, excluding major merchants in the area and 
British correspondents in nearby Bushire, giving Kuwait further leverage as a 
trading post (Blumi, 2012). 
The importance of Kuwait’s location of course did not go unnoticed by 
larger powers. As the Ottoman Empire sought to invigorate its suffering economy 
and link its provinces to the Anatolian metropole, Kuwait became the proposed end 
of the planned Berlin–Baghdad railway (Blumi, 2012). The proposed railway 
would dually attract European powers to its locality by the late 1800s in an attempt 
to secure a foothold and more favorable economic shares, as well as cause Kuwait 
to seek integrity even more aggressively (Rush, 1991a).  
Beginnings of Kuwaiti–British Relations 
Before the factors and events that led to Kuwait distancing itself from 
Ottoman control are presented, context regarding this Ottoman–Kuwaiti 
relationship must be detailed. As mentioned above, Kuwait’s geographic location 
provided a political environment that would later allow Kuwait to propel itself 
further from sole Ottoman influence through strategic balancing of major powers 
and local alliances. Historically, however, Kuwait had always enjoyed a degree of 
autonomy compared to areas in Ottoman Mesopotamia. In an administrative report 
by the local British agency in Kuwait, contextual political and historical 
information were provided to the British metropole. The document detailed that the 
sheikh was regarded a de facto ruler, but it documented a de jure governor by the 
Porte in the region (Archive Editions, 2020). This distinction would later allow the 
British to surpass higher powers in the Ottoman “chain of command” to deal with 
the Kuwaiti sheikh directly in order to manipulate this Ottoman “communications 
problem” when the right time came to sway Kuwait into their sphere of influence 
(Kumar, 1962, p. 71).  
Although the Kuwaiti sheikh Muhammad Al-Sabah embraced Ottoman 
relations, he was eventually assassinated by his ambitious half-brother, Mubarak 
Al-Sabah, in 1896. With Mubarak in power, realizations of Kuwait pulling away 
from Ottoman influence began. During his reign, Mubarak ran various military 
campaigns to extend his tribal reach further into the Arabian Peninsula (Archive 
Editions, 2020). This is also because his coup did not go completely unchallenged, 
as the late Muhammad Al-Sabah’s allies, such as Yousef Al-Ibrahim, attempted to 
counter Mubarak’s expansion militarily for more than two decades (Blumi, 2012) 
BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 7 
 
 192 
As Mubarak sought to fortify himself with regard to tribal alliances and the 
seeking of British help, Ottoman officials aimed to prevent the British from creating 
a toehold in Kuwait and saw the necessity of Mubarak’s “ejection” (Çetinsaya, 
2003, p. 201). Realizing that Kuwait was too autonomous for the Ottoman Empire’s 
integrity, officials planned to incorporate Kuwait in a “reconstitution” of Basra into 
a single kaza more effectively (Çetinsaya, 2003, p. 201). By 1899, Kuwait had 
secretly struck a deal with the British to guarantee its protection from Ottoman 
forces, effectively severing it from Basra (Rush, 1991a). Despite previous attempts 
by Mubarak to secure an agreement with the British, the British finally considered 
dealing with Kuwait as they realized the Russian and German interests in the land.  
Furthermore, once Curzon had assumed position as viceroy of India in 1898, 
he had insisted that Kuwait was instrumentally important to British interests with 
regard to India, trade routes, and ports in the Gulf (Muir, 2008; Pillai & Kumar, 
1962). This British interest in Kuwait is undoubtedly also linked to the fact that 
Kuwait was to be the endpoint of the Berlin–Baghdad railway, which pushed 
Britain to interfere with construction indirectly to increase its bargaining power 
against Germany. In this way, the British would ensure greater trade benefits once 
the Berlin–Baghdad railway was completed, especially that the tracks would lie 
precariously close to English–Iranian oil fields (Kumar, 1962). 
In 1903, with Curzon’s visit there, Kuwait became a de facto British 
protectorate, especially as Curzon recognized the threat of Kuwait falling back into 
Ottoman influence if Al Saud would be on the losing side of tribal spats with the 
Ottoman-backed Ibn Rashid (Al-Hamdi, 2015). By 1904, the British government 
tasked political resident Knox to monitor the Khor Abdallah as well as relations 
between Al Saud and other tribes in the vicinity. Knox’s reports had the dual 
purpose of protecting trade interests and maintaining the status quo that marked the 
official British presence in Kuwait (Muir, 2008). Consequently, Mubarak exploited 
the competition of foreign powers in gaining access to Kuwait to achieve his own 
ends.  
Despite the secret British deal and the rather autonomous dealings of the 
Kuwaiti sheikh, however, Kuwait continued accepting Ottoman titles, providing 
tax to the Ottoman metropole, receiving revenues from Ottoman-provisioned date 
farms to the north, and even providing aid for the 1912–1913 Ottoman–Balkan War 
(Rush, 1991a). This was to perhaps prevent open conflict, along with the added 
benefit of securing continuous and significant revenues from the date farms in a 
power-balancing act. 
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In 1913, however, the Anglo–Ottoman convention was signed. The 
convention delineated the rather previously ambiguous northern borders between 
Basra and Kuwait, granted Kuwait the islands of Bubiyan and Warbah, and 
declared Kuwait autonomous but under “Ottoman suzerainty” (Pillai & Kumar, 
1962, p. 118). During World War I, Anglo–Ottoman correspondences continued to 
detail Kuwait’s cession diplomatically. Ttrue recognition of the Kuwaiti state by 
the British Empire eventually occurred in 1914, with the outbreak of WWI, when 
Kuwait symbolically adopted a red flag with the Arabic word for its name (Rush, 
1991b). Consequently, Britain achieved its goal in establishing a protectorate in 
Kuwait, as mentioned previously. 
British interests in Kuwait continuously morphed throughout the 20th 
century as Kuwait went from being a key port and land post to a source of oil with 
the establishment of the KOC (Muir, 2008), meaning that Kuwait would have 
British support until its official independence. Kuwait’s nationalist endeavors to 
maintain its autonomy and the integrity of its borders continued until formal 
independence in 1961 in the face of Al Saud and Iraqi efforts, and even then, 
tensions remained with Iraq, later culminating in the 1990 Iraqi invasion. 
Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra 
The discussion of imperial relations with Ottoman Basra and, later on, Iraq 
better explicates the border disputes between Kuwait and its neighbor throughout 
the 20th century. 
Contrary to their rather clear-cut dealings with territories and tribes in the 
Gulf, British representatives found frequent difficulties in establishing a presence 
in the Basra province because of a far greater Ottoman grip represented by the 
regional administration’s jurisdiction and normative societal structures that were 
more complex compared to the very tribal relations in the Gulf (Clark, 2008). 
Additionally, Ottoman Basra represented a more highly multifaceted society, with 
deep variations in culture, religion, language, and local political affiliation (Simon, 
2004).  
The vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul came into Ottoman control 
under the reign of Sultan Suleyman I in 1534 (Yaphe, 2004). As discussed earlier, 
with regard to the importance of Kuwait’s geographic location, the vilayets were 
also instrumental to the Ottoman Empire because they were hubs for trade routes. 
Additionally, the vilayets were a separating frontier between the Ottomans and the 
Persians, which made them particularly challenging to manage and maintain long 
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before European powers showed interest. These tensions were a result of the 
multireligious and multiethnic nature of the vilayets’ residents, who found 
similarities with their Persian neighbors, especially in Baghdad (Simon, 2004). This 
diversity led to frequent revolts by Shi’i sects, which the Persians used to their 
advantage. Arab Lakhnids and Ghassanids, Kurds, and Eastern Christians also 
represented factions in society that neighboring empires utilized to incite unrest, 
particularly throughout the 18th century (Simon, 2004). Social and political 
disturbance became a feature of the area throughout World War I and well into the 
late 20th century, especially in areas such as Kerbala and Baghdad (Yaphe, 2004). 
The British and Iraq 
Prior to British occupation of Iraq in 1917 and the establishment of military 
rule, the British had entered Ottoman Basra through the British Mesopotamian 
Expeditionary Force in 1914 (Al-Hamdi, 2015; Simon, 2004). At the time, the 
British had identified the desire of local Arab Ottoman associates to become 
autonomous, albeit within the Ottoman system (Yaphe, 2004). Prior to World War 
I, the British had accumulated intelligence to infer certain dynamics within the Iraqi 
provinces among the various religious, nationalist, and ethnic movements. As the 
British began to settle in the recently conquered Iraq, however, their perceptions 
were found to be largely false; movements became more heterogenous and began 
to clash more violently and frequently, as mentioned previously (Wagner, 2015). 
Policies to “civilize” the Arabs in Iraq into an independent state after World 
War I were deliberated rather haphazardly and chaotically by several British 
governmental entities: the War Office, the Foreign Office, the Arab Bureau, and 
the India Office (Yaphe, 2004). In the vein of their methods of Indian rule, the 
British attempted to create cleavages in Iraqi society by giving tribal leaders 
considerable agency with tax collection and dispute resolution based on tribal 
customs and land ownership, for instance, which had been largely absent during 
Ottoman rule. This favoring of tribal provincial rule was an attempt to counter the 
increasing influence of city folk, who had overwhelmingly nationalist ideas 
(Yaphe, 2004); however, because Britain was implementing a one-size-fits-all 
strategy in Iraq, domestic stability soon evaporated and tribal sheikhs became 
increasingly authoritarian and brutal, thwarting political development (Yaphe, 
2004). 
Unrest became especially pronounced after World War I, and Foreign 
Office officials sensed nationalist sentiment growing at an “unstoppable 
momentum” (Simon, 2004, p. 36). Not long after, the 1920 revolt began and was a 
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unifying event, joining the multiple religious sects and residents of differing 
socioeconomic status to combat hypertaxation, unemployment due to the 
appointment of British officials in the British Civil Administration, and even calls 
for an independent Arab Islamic state (Wagner, 2015). 
After quelling the rebellion by force, the British government worked to 
reconsolidate control by abolishing military rule and setting up a Western-inspired 
constitution in 1921, promising representation, checked power, and democracy 
(Wagner, 2015). Following this came British deliberations on whom to appoint, 
these being easily manipulated, pliable leaders and officials. As a result, an 
inexperienced Sunni religious official leader was chosen, as well as a Hashemite 
Arab, King Faysal I, who had no particular affiliation with any faction of Iraqi 
society at the time (Simon, 2004). The result was something termed an institutional 
façade (Yaphe, 2004, p. 33), a method for more indirect British control of Iraq.  
Now with an established government, treaties, such as the binding 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne, detailed the formation of the country of Iraq in the joining of 
the three vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul—with no mention of Kuwait 
(Pillai & Kumar, 1962). Upon Iraqi independence in 1932, another frontier-
management agreement was drawn, with Sir Percy Cox issuing a memorandum 
with Prime Minister al-Askari, to detail Kuwaiti–Iraqi borders once more based on 
the 1913 Anglo–Ottoman convention (Al-Hamdi, 2015), reiterating its legitimacy 
despite its ratification being previously interrupted by World War I. 
Once a very Western-influenced and maladjusted Iraqi government was in 
place, certain dynamics began to play out both domestically and bilaterally, with 
Kuwait, throughout the 20th century.  
Kuwait and Iraq  
As discussed previously, Pan-Arab/nationalist movements continued with 
fervor even after the British had assigned an Iraqi constitutional government (Al-
Hamdi, 2015). After Faysal I’s death following Iraqi independence, however, a very 
staunchly nationalist Ghazi I was king and was highly maximalist in his diplomatic 
stance. To disseminate his ideology broadly, Ghazi I ran a radio station; propaganda 
was rampant in the press. Using his media channels, Ghazi I illustrated ideas such 
as that Kuwait was an illegitimate state and was instead part of Iraq. To support this 
view, he cited Ottoman-era relations despite border delineations spanning back to 
1913 (Pillai & Kumar, 1962). By 1938, Ghazi I’s claims reached their height; a 
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military attack was planned, but when he unexpectedly died, the plan was 
abandoned (Muir, 2008). 
The advocation of nationalist and pan-Arab sentiment endured with 
politicians as well. Prime Minister al-Said, under Faysal II, promoted secular pan-
Arab sentiments and threatened to annex Kuwaiti islands when Kuwait refused to 
join a Hashemite union (i.e., AHU) to contribute funds (Al-Hamdi, 2015). 
Additionally, al-Said’s fervent desire for Kuwait to join a Hashemite union might 
have been an implicit diplomatic gesture to imply that Kuwait belonged within Iraqi 
borders. 
As the monarchy was overthrown in 1958 and a republic was established 
under Qasim, however, nationalistic policies and diplomacy increased in 
aggressiveness and frequency, with Qasim refusing to acknowledge Kuwaiti 
independence in 1961, publicly stating that Kuwait was “an integral part of Iraq” 
(Clark, 2008, p. 9). At this time, Kuwait had already established its position in the 
international arena—at times even with help from the Iraqi government to join 
international organizations—and had considerable influence on the British market 
economy (Muir, 2008). This implicit threat by Qasim led to Kuwait requesting 
British assistance preemptively, as well as a UNSC meeting being held. Iraq took 
this opportunity to harness growing anti-British sentiment among Arab nations, but 
it received little support from fellow Arab nations in opposing Kuwait (Al-Hamdi, 
2015). As Qasim’s successor, Arif of the Ba’athist regime, continued to push the 
claim on Kuwait, Iraq suffered domestic political unrest and a significant loss of 
diplomatic ties (Muir, 2008).  
Claims to Kuwait were based on historical Ottoman links, despite the 
technical autonomy of Kuwait during that time and despite conventions detailing 
borders, as mentioned previously. This was in part because Kuwait could provide 
Iraq closer access to the Gulf and, after the discovery of oil, to more than 15% of 
the world’s oil reserves (Pillai & Kumar, 1962). Furthermore, Iraq had experienced 
tensions and border disputes with its neighbor Iran spanning from the days of 
Ottoman rule, eventually leading to an economically devastating war with Iran 
under Saddam Hussein (Yaphe, 2004). The Iraq–Iran War brought an already 
politically turbulent and economically feeble Iraq to its knees, instigating the 1990 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to reconstitute losses on the grounds of reclaiming the 
“rogue” state of Kuwait back into Iraqi control (Simon, 2004). 
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Power Balancing: Consequences and Effects 
Ilai Saltzman’s 2011 book, Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A 
Polymorphic Reconceptualization, reimagines common theories and strategies of 
power balancing in international relations—such as soft- and hard balancing, buck-
passing, and bandwagoning—in a revised, multifaceted framework with security at 
its core. Relatedly, Randall Schweller’s 2006 book, Unanswered Threats: Political 
Constraints on the Balance of Power, explores the causes for underbalancing in 
terms of both domestic and international threats by discussing elements such as 
social/elite cohesion and regime vulnerability. In this section, the theories presented 
in the two books will be used to discuss and tie in the factors that led to Britain 
gaining influence in the Ottoman Gulf and contributing to Iraqi domestic unrest, 
which encouraged border disputes and later, the 1990 Iraqi invasion. 
The Ottomans 
In the context of the Ottoman Empire in the mid- to late 1800s, Schweller’s 
ideas of underbalancing are very much relevant, as mentioned earlier, with the 
complaints of Ottoman officials regarding a lack of “forward” policies, along with 
the Ottoman policy neglecting the British presence. What prompts a state to delay 
reactive policy toward governmental threats or concerns? According to Schweller 
(2006), incoherent policies result from factors such as a lack of elite consensus, 
governmental regime vulnerability, and threats to social cohesion. Additionally, an 
important fact to consider is that decisions by individual policy makers occur after 
assessments of perceived threat rather than of what is, which could lead to mishaps 
in deciding power-balancing policies (Saltzman, 2011). All of the previous factors 
have been exhibited, with the rise of Pan-Arabism and other social divisions in 
Ottoman provinces, the threat of European powers, and the tumultuous reforms in 
Ottoman administration, all discussed previously, leading to what Schweller termed 
policy paralysis, which is caused by a weakened government generally having less 
policy capacity (2006, p. 57). Furthermore, a compromised sense of governmental 
legitimacy as a result of fragmented social cohesion would limit a state’s options to 
enforce hard-balancing policies for fear of antigovernmental action in response. 
Relatedly, limited domestic social cohesion often means that outsider threats do not 
have the usual effect of increasing cohesion but rather disband ingroups further, as 
with Iran and Shi’i groups in Basra, for instance.   
Jack Snyder, however, has also suggested that instability in a state’s regime 
would bring about another reaction in policy making: overexpansion (as cited in 
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Schweller, 2006). Overexpansion was what the Young Turks attempted after their 
assumption of power in the years before World War I. It should be noted that 
overexpansion could refer to both spatial expansion and expansion of executive 
power. Synder identifies two elements to a government’s decision to implement 
overexpansion (which must not be confused with overbalancing): a weak central 
authority and several concentrated interest groups (as cited in Schweller, 2006). In 
the Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks came the continual development of 
pan-Arab sentiment, conflict among the Young Turks themselves, and conflict 
between Ottoman liberals and the Young Turk administration (Hurewtiz, 1914), 
which led to policies that Arabs viewed as increasingly antagonizing (e.g., tighter 
military and naval presences, and Turkification policies), eventually encouraging 
Arab leaders to seek soft-balancing policies with European powers (e.g., Kuwait’s 
agreement with the British). 
The British 
Although the Ottomans in the 19th century and early 20th century did not 
engage in overbalancing with regard to Arab provinces, the British in many ways 
did so as they gained more control of the region through the early and mid-20th 
century. Along with overbalancing both during and after World War I, the British 
initially implemented various soft-balancing techniques to gain a larger presence in 
the Gulf in their quest to establish protectorates in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, etc.  
Although still a confrontational method of power balancing, soft balancing 
often does not feature open conflict. Instead, soft balancing can include diplomatic 
maneuvering, nonmilitaristic policies, and institutional binding, and hard balancing 
may be only a plan B to avoid widening conflict within the current balance of power 
(Saltzman, 2011). In this instance, one example is the British cooperating with the 
administrations of Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Young Turks while dealing with 
local leaders in the Arabian Peninsula to secure personal interests and undermine 
the Ottoman Empire from within. A prime example, of course, is the previously 
discussed British deal with Kuwait, in which Kuwait also played an expertly tuned 
game of soft balancing with the Ottomans and rivaling European powers. Although 
the British’s soft-balancing measures were sound in upholding British interests with 
regard to the political climate in the Arabian Peninsula and the insufficient, 
underbalanced Ottoman response, the British began to significantly misinterpret 
and misperceive the status quo as time wore on. In decision-making, state officials 
must judge the level of threat domestically and internationally, as well as determine 
the “resource extraction potential” at their disposal (Saltzman, 2011, p. 33)—that 
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is, how capable their state is politically, militarily, diplomatically, and 
economically to undertake certain policies. On one hand, it can be assumed that by 
1917, as the British moved into Ottoman Mesopotamia, British officials considered 
their resource-extraction potential high. This perception was due to their successes 
in the Gulf and their advantage in World War I. On the other hand, the threat of the 
occupied society dissenting is also perceived as high because of British militaristic 
rule and drastic policies aiming to dramatically assert British control in an effort to 
occupy the power vacuum left by the Ottomans. Snyder regards overbalancing 
policies as both very costly and very likely to take away privileges from various 
factions in society (as cited in Schweller, 2006). That being said, the overbalancing 
policies of the British in what later became Iraq repressed significant portions of 
society and highly privileged a select few, fueling dissent and instability as the 
public refused the new balance of power that the British were attempting to instill, 
and the British left a maladjusted, volatile Iraqi political environment in their wake 
as they retreated by 1932. 
Conclusion 
As demonstrated in the previous section, it is important to note the crucial 
connection between domestic politics and external policies throughout the 
discussions of Ottoman policy (or lack thereof), Kuwaiti alliances, and British 
presence in the Gulf. That is to say, domestic shifts in power have all led to 
definitive events connected to Kuwaiti independence and Kuwaiti–Iraqi border 
conflicts: Muhammad Al-Sabah’s assassination, Curzon’s assumption of the 
position as viceroy of India, Pan-Arabism’s gaining of support, and the Ottoman 
Empire’s suffering through various unsuccessful reforms. 
Building on the Ottoman Empire’s internal political tumult, it becomes clear 
that the once finely tuned system to govern and administer provinces has become 
ineffective. This ineffectiveness was exhibited by the numerous movements 
dissenting from Ottoman cohesion, as well as the failure of Ottoman officials 
overseeing these areas to appease the growing ethno-religious movements (e.g., 
Orthodox Christianity, Shi’i Islam, Pan-Arabism) or to recognize that they were a 
threat that might need intervention by the Ottoman metropole, in the 
aforementioned “communications problem” (Kumar, 1962).  
As discussed above, these growing separationist sentiments were attractive 
to European imperial powers aiming to gain further influence around the Ottoman 
Empire’s borders and slowly chip away at its core. Meanwhile, leaders in areas 
such as Kuwait took advantage of their territories’ political, geographic, and 
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economic importance to achieve their desires of autonomy by balancing various 
powers appropriately over time. Once imperial powers gained further access and 
influence into the Gulf through agreements such as this with local leaders, however, 
their policies were not as predictable, as seen with Iraq and the British. 
Britain’s miscalculations in power balancing during World War I and 
throughout the early 20th century in what was once Ottoman Mesopotamia 
reiterated Ottoman convictions that British presence in the Arab provinces was akin 
to a civilizing mission—the British disregarded the complexities of the occupied 
community and assumed that all those from a general geographic location required 
similar policies (which were mostly built on a more aggressive divide-and-rule 
method once the British assumed power).  
Legacies of imperialism include governmental infrastructures that the now 
“free” people are left to grapple with to define their new national identity. In the 
case of Iraq, this proved a detrimental move by the British, later inspiring major 
upheavals domestically as well as bilaterally. Relatedly, as previously mentioned, 
domestic conditions are a great determinant of political decisions, meaning that the 
raging clash of movements within Iraq left leaders with limited options for 
maintaining control and nationalistic identity. Further, outsider threats (whether 
real or perceived) are one method of improving cohesion, further encouraging Iraqi 
authorities to instigate conflict over border integrity throughout the 20th century, 
with heightened claims in times of economic distress or war, culminating in the 
1990 Iraqi invasion on Kuwait, a territory largely autonomous before its 
independence and fully sovereign at the time of the attack. Power-balancing 
shortcomings by both Ottoman officials and the British government with regard to 
Arab territories hence contributed to major political changes in both Kuwait and 
Iraq, with some being quite detrimental. 
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